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Dirimens Copulatio

Dirimens Copulatio (di’-ri-mens ko-pu-la’-ti-o): A figure by which one balances one statement with a contrary, qualifying statement (sometimes conveyed by “not only … but also” clauses). A sort of arguing both sides of an issue.

Protagoras (c. 485-410 BC) asserted that “to every logos (speech or argument) another logos is opposed,” a theme continued in the Dissoi Logoiof his time, later codified as the notion of arguments in utrumque partes (on both sides). Aristotle asserted that thinking in opposites is necessary both to arrive at the true state of a matter (opposition as an epistemological heuristic) and to anticipate counterarguments. This latter, practical purpose for investigating opposing arguments has been central to rhetoric ever since sophists like Antiphon (c. 480-410 BC) provided model speeches (his Tetralogies) showing how one might argue for either the prosecution or for the defense on any given issue. As such, [this] names not so much a figure of speech as a general approach to rhetoric, or an overall argumentative strategy. However, it could be manifest within a speech on a local level as well, especially for the purposes of exhibiting fairness (establishing ethos[audience perception of speaker credibility].

This pragmatic embrace of opposing arguments permeates rhetorical invention, arrangement, and rhetorical pedagogy. [In a sense, ‘two-wayed thinking’ constitutes a way of life—it is tolerant of differences and may interpret their resolution as contingent and provisional, as always open to renegotiation, and never as the final word. Truth, at best, offers cold comfort in social settings and often establishes itself as incontestable, by definition, as immune from untrumque partes, which may be considered an act of heresy and may be punishable by death.]


“Not only is that a dog, but it acts like a cat too.” That was our problem. Now I see it. I had found the animal in a ditch by a country road. It was wet, filthy, covered with ticks and smelled like a wet dog—no surprises there! He has a mask on his face like a raccoon and a giant fluffy tail that was as long as he was. He was the size of a of a large goat, had big pointy ears, and was at least six or seven colors—there was a dispute over his front right leg—whether it was dark brown or black. As we drove home he stood on the back seat wagging his tail, which kept hitting my wife in the back of the head. I kept yelling “sit” but he just looked at me with his tongue hanging out. I gave up.

We named him “Ditch” after where we found him. He was a sort of friendly “dog” (of giant cat?). Hee wasn’t mean. Rather, he was indifferent most of the time. I’d call him—“Here Ditch”—and he wouldn’t even look at me. If he was sleeping, sometimes he lifted up his head when I called him or gave me little wag. I considered that a major accomplishment. Then one Saturday, I decided to take Ditch to the pet store to get some food. Once inside the pet store, when we walked past the cat litter boxes, Ditch sat down and pawed them until the entire display fell over. Clearly, he wanted a litter box, but they were too small for him to fit in. However, I had an idea! I bought 15 bags of kitty litter and we headed to the Dollar Store. I bought a plastic molded kiddie pool to serve as Ditch’s litter box. I put it in the basement and filled it with kitty litter. Ditch loved it. No more poop bombs on the living room carpet!

As time went on, Ditch became more and more like a cat. I had to make him a giant catnip ball—the size of a soccer ball. He would get high on the catnip and run around the house knocking things over. Then, he started scratching furniture. He took the side of our couch off in a 5-minute session. I couldn’t stop him. He was too fast and too strong. It was like paws of fury. To put a stop to the destruction, I made a scratching post from one of the maple trees I had planted five years ago in the front yard. I put it in the living room. It reached to the ceiling. I started buying Ditch live lobsters. I’d throw them on the kitchen floor. The crunching sound the lobsters made when he ate them was unnerving, but he loved seafood. I figured it was his cat side.

One of Ditch’s favorite things to do was to tip over the flat screen TV. I had to glue it to the TV stand. The worst, was his opening the refrigerator and scattering its contents on the floor. I had a hasp installed on the refrigerator door, and we kept it padlocked so Ditch couldn’t open it.

Then one night, I was awakened by a “Meow” that shook the house’s windows and scared our goldfish Lulu out of her bowl. I found her dead on the living room floor. Ditch was crouched over her drooling profusely. It was frightening. It prompted me to find out more about Ditch. I immediately Googled “Giant multi-colored cat-like dog, likes seafood.” I got one hit. It was a missing dog notice for “Number 146.” The description fit Ditch, and the photo was definitely him. It had been posted by “Mr. Big” and there was a $200,000 reward for his return.

I nearly shit my pants! Given Ditch’s character, I had no trouble deciding to turn him in for the reward. I called Mr. Big and gave him my home address. The next day an unmarked van pulled up in front of my house. A man wearing shorts and a T-shirt saying “Mr. Big” hopped out. He was carrying a briefcase and a huge dog biscuit shaped like a rabbit. When Ditch saw Mr. Big, he started running around in circles, chasing his tail. He was clearly overjoyed to see Mr, Big. I was relieved. Mr. Big handed me the briefcase. I opened it and it was filled with $100 bills. Mr. Big handed the dog biscuit to Ditch and he gobbled it up and then passed out. Mr. Big’s assistants carried Ditch on a stretcher out to the waiting van.

I was not the least bit sad. “Good riddance” I thought as I opened the briefcase again and contemplated the neatly arranged $100 bills. I don’t know whether Ditch was a dog or a cat, but one thing I’m sure of: he was a pain in the ass.

The only thing I liked about him was his giant tail.


Definitions courtesy of “Silva Rhetoricae” (rhetoric.byu.edu

Daily Trope is available in an early edition on Amazon in paperback under the title of The Book of Tropes for $9.95. It is also available in Kindle format for $5.99.

Dirimens Copulatio

Dirimens Copulatio (di’-ri-mens ko-pu-la’-ti-o): A figure by which one balances one statement with a contrary, qualifying statement (sometimes conveyed by “not only … but also” clauses). A sort of arguing both sides of an issue.

Protagoras (c. 485-410 BC) asserted that “to every logos (speech or argument) another logos is opposed,” a theme continued in the Dissoi Logoi of his time, later codified as the notion of arguments in utrumque partes (on both sides). Aristotle asserted that thinking in opposites is necessary both to arrive at the true state of a matter (opposition as an epistemological heuristic) and to anticipate counterarguments. This latter, practical purpose for investigating opposing arguments has been central to rhetoric ever since sophists like Antiphon (c. 480-410 BC) provided model speeches (his Tetralogies) showing how one might argue for either the prosecution or for the defense on any given issue. As such, [this] names not so much a figure of speech as a general approach to rhetoric, or an overall argumentative strategy. However, it could be manifest within a speech on a local level as well, especially for the purposes of exhibiting fairness (establishing ethos [audience perception of speaker credibility].

This pragmatic embrace of opposing arguments permeates rhetorical invention, arrangement, and rhetorical pedagogy. [In a sense, ‘two-wayed thinking’ constitutes a way of life—it is tolerant of differences and may interpret their resolution as contingent and provisional, as always open to renegotiation, and never as the final word. Truth, at best, offers cold comfort in social settings and often establishes itself as incontestable, by definition, as immune from untrumque partes, which may be considered an act of heresy and may be punishable by death.]


We live in a world of circumstances—we are contained by thought-altering differences that have weight in determining what course to take. Truth is of little use, because there are multiple truths piled up around a given point of decision. Conflicts in this space are best resolved by persuasion—judgements of what is better or worse, right or wrong, not solely by applying what appears to be true and false: you are not supposed to lie. Tell the truth! The Nazis are at your door looking for your children. They are hiding in your basement. You lie and tell them you haven’t seen your children for weeks. Lying is a good thing here. If you told the truth, your children would be taken away. This a time-worn example, but it still makes a important point: lying can be good, telling the truth can be evil. They have no intrinsic moral valance, it emerges in the particular case, when they are told for better and for worse. Just think, if your commitment to truth was unassailable, in the example above, you would kill your children. Good idea? Is there something superior to truth operative here in the process of making a decision? Is there ever a hierarchy of truths prior to their engagement in a moment of decision? Making good decisions is about weighing alternatives, but again, maybe not.


Definition and commentary courtesy of “Silva Rhetoricae” (rhetoric.byu.edu). Bracketed text by Gogias, Editor of Daily Trope.

A paper edition of The Daily Trope, entitled The Book of Tropes, is available for purchase on Amazon for $9.99. There is also a Kindle edition available for $5.99.

Dirimens Copulatio

Dirimens Copulatio (di’-ri-mens ko-pu-la’-ti-o): A figure by which one balances one statement with a contrary, qualifying statement (sometimes conveyed by “not only … but also” clauses). A sort of arguing both sides of an issue.

Protagoras (c. 485-410 BC) asserted that “to every logos (speech or argument) another logos is opposed,” a theme continued in the Dissoi Logoi of his time, later codified as the notion of arguments in utrumque partes (on both sides). Aristotle asserted that thinking in opposites is necessary both to arrive at the true state of a matter (opposition as an epistemological heuristic) and to anticipate counterarguments. This latter, practical purpose for investigating opposing arguments has been central to rhetoric ever since sophists like Antiphon (c. 480-410 BC) provided model speeches (his Tetralogies) showing how one might argue for either the prosecution or for the defense on any given issue. As such, [this] names not so much a figure of speech as a general approach to rhetoric, or an overall argumentative strategy. However, it could be manifest within a speech on a local level as well, especially for the purposes of exhibiting fairness (establishing ethos [audience perception of speaker credibility]).

This pragmatic embrace of opposing arguments permeates rhetorical invention, arrangement, and rhetorical pedagogy.

I love a sunny day! Not only that, I love a cloudy day. The sun is warm. The clouds are cool. Feeling this way, I feel at home with the weather–I feel at home in the world.

Definition and commentary courtesy of “Silva Rhetoricae” (rhetoric.byu.edu).

A paper edition of The Daily Trope, entitled The Book of Tropes, is available for purchase on Amazon for $9.99. There is also a Kindle edition available for $5.99.

Dirimens Copulatio

Dirimens Copulatio (di’-ri-mens ko-pu-la’-ti-o): A figure by which one balances one statement with a contrary, qualifying statement (sometimes conveyed by “not only … but also” clauses). A sort of arguing both sides of an issue.

Protagoras (c. 485-410 BC) asserted that “to every logos (speech or argument) another logos is opposed,” a theme continued in the Dissoi Logoi of his time, later codified as the notion of arguments in utrumque partes (on both sides). Aristotle asserted that thinking in opposites is necessary both to arrive at the true state of a matter (opposition as an epistemological heuristic) and to anticipate counterarguments. This latter, practical purpose for investigating opposing arguments has been central to rhetoric ever since sophists like Antiphon (c. 480-410 BC) provided model speeches (his Tetralogies) showing how one might argue for either the prosecution or for the defense on any given issue. As such, [this] names not so much a figure of speech as a general approach to rhetoric, or an overall argumentative strategy. However, it could be manifest within a speech on a local level as well, especially for the purposes of exhibiting fairness (establishing ethos [audience perception of speaker credibility]).

This pragmatic embrace of opposing arguments permeates rhetorical invention, arrangement, and rhetorical pedagogy

I want a muffin for breakfast. Not only that, I want it toasted in the toaster-oven and buttered to perfection. Not only is it your turn to cook this week, but it is time for us to figure out how to make muffins. But you disagree? Come on, no time for that: get out the flour, the cranberries, the butter, the mixing bowl, the sugar, and most important, a spatula.

  • Post your own dirimens copulatio on the “Comments” page!

Definition and commentary courtesy of “Silva Rhetoricae” (rhetoric.byu.edu).

A paper edition of The Daily Trope, entitled The Book of Tropes, is available for purchase on Amazon for $9.99 USD. It contains over 200 schemes and tropes with their definitions and examples of each. All of the schemes and tropes are indexed, so it’s easy to find the one you’re looking for. Not only that, the examples of schemes and tropes may prompt you to try to create your own examples and use them as springboards for creating longer narratives.

Dirimens Copulatio

Dirimens Copulatio (di’-ri-mens ko-pu-la’-ti-o): A figure by which one balances one statement with a contrary, qualifying statement (sometimes conveyed by “not only … but also” clauses). A sort of arguing both sides of an issue.

Protagoras (c. 485-410 BC) asserted that “to every logos (speech or argument) another logos is opposed,” a theme continued in the Dissoi Logoi of his time, later codified as the notion of arguments in utrumque partes (on both sides). Aristotle asserted that thinking in opposites is necessary both to arrive at the true state of a matter (opposition as an epistemological heuristic) and to anticipate counterarguments. This latter, practical purpose for investigating opposing arguments has been central to rhetoric ever since sophists like Antiphon (c. 480-410 BC) provided model speeches (his Tetralogies) showing how one might argue for either the prosecution or for the defense on any given issue. As such, [this] names not so much a figure of speech as a general approach to rhetoric, or an overall argumentative strategy. However, it could be manifest within a speech on a local level as well, especially for the purposes of exhibiting fairness (establishing ethos [audience perception of speaker credibility]).

This pragmatic embrace of opposing arguments permeates rhetorical invention, arrangement, and rhetorical pedagogy.

When faced with a decision, time and place may vex our motives.  For example, being unable to be full of praise and full of rage toward the same issue, person, idea or anything else from within the compass of here and now, we are at a crisis, a stasis, a standstill.

Realizing that there are advantages and disadvantages to all prompts to decision we are stuck in a rut for the time-being.  That is, we must drive the road to judgment under the spell of a consistent motive, or we may zigzag, stop and start, back up, go forward, skid, lurch, crash, or, if we’re lucky (or unlucky), run out of gas, never getting anywhere, staying stuck in a rut.

In sum, while there may be two or more opposed why-ways to drive into the unknowable future, if you’re going to get anywhere at all, you must have the foresight to take a single (because best) why-way to your hope’s destination. Nevertheless, realize that there may be unforeseen roadblocks along the way that necessitate taking a detour–a different why-way–in order to get to your destination.

As a reminder of what may happen between now and then, here and there, I have a statue of Stephen Toulmin glued to my decision dashboard.  For he is the cousin of Hermes, the grandson of Magellan, and the Supreme Spirit of Life’s Road Trips.

  • Post your own dirimens copulatio on the “Comments” page!

Definition and commentary courtesy of “Silva Rhetoricae” (rhetoric.byu.edu).

Dirimens Copulatio

Dirimens Copulatio (di’-ri-mens ko-pu-la’-ti-o): A figure by which one balances one statement with a contrary, qualifying statement (sometimes conveyed by “not only … but also” clauses). A sort of arguing both sides of an issue.

Protagoras (c. 485-410 BC) asserted that “to every logos (speech or argument) another logos is opposed,” a theme continued in the Dissoi Logoi of his time, later codified as the notion of arguments in utrumque partes (on both sides). Aristotle asserted that thinking in opposites is necessary both to arrive at the true state of a matter (opposition as an epistemological heuristic) and to anticipate counterarguments. This latter, practical purpose for investigating opposing arguments has been central to rhetoric ever since sophists like Antiphon (c. 480-410 BC) provided model speeches (his Tetralogies) showing how one might argue for either the prosecution or for the defense on any given issue. As such, [this] names not so much a figure of speech as a general approach to rhetoric, or an overall argumentative strategy. However, it could be manifest within a speech on a local level as well, especially for the purposes of exhibiting fairness (establishing ethos [audience perception of speaker credibility]).

This pragmatic embrace of opposing arguments permeates rhetorical invention, arrangement, and rhetorical pedagogy.

Not only should one tell the truth, but also, one should be prepared to lie when lying is warranted. Let me explain how this pertains to . . .

  • Post your own dirimens copulatio on the “Comments” page!

Definition and commentary courtesy of “Silva Rhetoricae” (rhetoric.byu.edu).